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Abstract
The Domain Name System (DNS) provides important name resolution services on the Internet.
The DNS has been found to have security flaws which have the potential to undermine the
reliability of many Internet-based systems. DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) offers a longterm solution these DNS security flaws. However, DNSSEC adoption has been slow because it is
challenging to deploy and administer. DNSSEC has also been criticized for not being an “end-to
end” solution. Microsoft included support for DNSSEC in its latest operating systems, Windows
Server 2008 R2 and Windows 7. This thesis concluded that DNSSEC features in Windows
Server 2008 R2 and Windows 7 are not fully developed and are unlikely to impact DNSSEC
adoption rates.
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Chapter 1 – Introduction

The Domain Name System (DNS) is a foundational service of the Internet, and the DNS
is showing cracks in the form of security vulnerabilities. DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC)
provides a layer of security to close those security gaps. However, DNSSEC adoption rates have
been low. Microsoft, a major technology vendor, released new operating systems Windows 7 and
Windows Server 2008 Release 2 (R2) in late 2009. These new operating systems offer DNSSEC
features. This thesis will evaluate whether the latest Microsoft offerings provide significant
advancements in DNSSEC technology which could lead to increased adoption of DNSSEC.
The DNS translates user-friendly domain names (e.g. www.regis.edu) into networkfriendly IP addresses (e.g. 207.93.211.100). The original designers of DNS did not include
security as one of the design goals. Today, it is understood that DNS-related security
vulnerabilities exist, and that they have the potential to undermine the reliability of many Internet
services (Atkins & Austein, 2004; Chandramouli & Rose, 2006). In light of increased
commercial use of the Internet, security vulnerabilities in a fundamental building block of the
Internet (DNS) could have wide-ranging detrimental effects on finance, commerce, and the
economy (United States, 2003, p. 30).
DNSSEC is a suite of IETF specifications designed to add security to DNS and protect
against certain vulnerabilities (Arends, Austein, Larson, Massey & Rose, 2005; Eastlake &
Kaufmann, 1997). The current core specifications are IETF RFCs 4033, 4034 and 4035 (Arends
et al., 2005). DNSSEC adds a layer of authentication to DNS, so a DNS caching server
requesting a DNS lookup from an authoritative DNS server has assurance that the response is
correct. DNSSEC does not provide confidentiality—Internet DNS records are intended to be
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visible (Arends et al., 2005). DNSSEC does not protect against distributed denial of service
(DDoS) attacks. In fact, the increased overhead of DNSSEC could make DNS more vulnerable
to DDoS (Arends et al., 2005).
Adoption of DNSSEC has been slow, but interest in DNSSEC has increased significantly
since July 2008 when Dan Kaminsky presented a paper describing a relatively easy way to
exploit a vulnerability in DNS to carry out DNS cache poisoning attacks (The Internet
Infrastructure Foundation, n.d.; Morris, n.d.). Before the “Kaminsky” paper, it was widely
believed that DNSSEC was a solution to a largely-theoretical problem. Other problems were
more pressing. Kaminsky illustrated a real DNS security problem, and DNSSEC offers the only
long-term solution (Friedlander, Mankin, Maughan, & Crocker, 2007; The Internet Infrastructure
Foundation, n.d.).
Microsoft Windows Server 2008 R2 and Windows 7, both released in 2009, are the first
Microsoft operating systems that support the three core DNSSEC specifications (RFCs 4033,
4034 and 4035) (Microsoft, 2009). Windows 7 is the first client operating system to offer a
bundled DNSSEC solution (Microsoft, 2009). Support from Microsoft, a company that controls a
large share of the operating system market, is an indication that DNSSEC may become a
“mainstream” technology.
This thesis will test and evaluate whether the latest Microsoft operating systems provide
solutions to the problems that have resulted in slow DNSSEC adoption. Is DNSSEC easy to
deploy in Microsoft Windows Server 2008 R2 and Windows 7? Now that DNSSEC is bundled
with a Microsoft client operating system for the first time, can one consider this an “end-to-end”
DNSSEC solution for the mass market? Does DNSSEC in Windows 7 provide the end user with
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meaningful, actionable feedback? Is Windows DNSSEC compatible with Unix/BIND DNSSEC?
Is administration of DNSSEC in windows server 2008R2 user-friendly?
The testing procedures take place in a lab environment with several operating systems
installed as virtual machines. The lab includes four virtual machines, described in detail in
Appendix A: Two Microsoft Windows Server 2008 R2 with DNS Server and DNSSEC,
Windows 7 Professional with the “non-validating security-aware stub resolver”, and Solaris 10
with BIND and DNSSEC extensions. The lab environment is described in detail in Appendix A.
This thesis contributes to the existing DNSSEC literature by evaluating a new offering
from one of the largest players in the IT industry. If Microsoft DNSSEC is easy to install and
administer, and if it effectively brings DNSSEC to the client level with Windows 7, then this will
result in larger numbers of people choosing to deploy DNSSEC. Microsoft has a majority share
of the client operating system market. An effective DNSSEC solution from Microsoft could
strengthen its hold on the market, could likely lead to quicker adoption of DNSSEC by more
businesses, and contribute to increased security for the Internet community as a whole.
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Chapter 2 – Overview of DNS, DNSSEC, and Windows DNSSEC

DNS is a Critical Service
The Domain Name System (DNS) is fundamental to the functionality of the Internet. The
DNS translates user-friendly host names (e.g. www.regis.edu) into network-friendly IP addresses
(e.g. 207.93.211.100) (Liu & Albitz, 2006, Ch. 1). The DNS also enables applications like e-mail
to identify servers associated with a service (Liu & Albitz, 2006, Ch. 5). Imagine these
conversations between people that would be necessary without the DNS: “Please visit my web
site at 207.93.211.100.” “Send me an e-mail at hair289@207.93.211.120. If 207.93.211.120 fails
to respond, please send the message to one of these alternate mail servers in this order of priority:
207.93.211.121, 207.93.211.122, 207.93.211.123, or 207.93.211.124.” The Internet would not
function as it currently does without the DNS.
The DNS is designed for scalability and availability as a distributed database (Liu &
Albitz, 2006, Ch. 2). The namespace structure is a hierarchical tree starting at the root or “.”. The
first branches are top level domain names (TLDs), then the next level has domain names, as
illustrated in Figure 1.
root “.”

com

google

net

edu

regis

Figure 1. Illustration of the DNS namespace hierarchy.
Each branch in the namespace has one or more authoritative name servers that store
information for that domain. The root name servers are authoritative for the root, and store
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delegations for name servers that are authoritative for the TLDs. The .edu TLD servers store
delegations for name servers that are authoritative for each domain name registered within the
.edu TLD, for example, regis.edu. The regis.edu name servers store the hostnames and IP
addresses for the regis.edu zone. The delegation of the namespace tree continues as far as needed
(Liu & Albitz, 2006, Ch. 2).
The DNS is further distributed by function: DNS servers can perform one or all of these
functions: authoritative (primary or secondary), forwarding, resolving, or caching. An
authoritative name server stores the zone file containing hostnames and IP addresses for the
domain name for which it is authoritative. A resolving name server listens for queries from
clients and attempts to resolve the queries through forwarding, recursion, or its own cache. A
forwarding name server acts as an intermediary, forwarding queries to Internet name servers. A
caching name server stores hostnames and IP addresses which it has already resolved so that it
does not have to spend resources (bandwidth, processor) in looking them up again within their
TTL (time to live) period (see Figure 2) (Liu & Albitz, 2006, Ch. 2).

EVALUATION OF MICROSOFT DNSSEC

6

Figure 2. Illustration of DNS server functions.
It is also possible to have private DNS namespaces. Companies commonly maintain DNS
namespaces within their private networks, where each server, workstation and device on the
private network has a hostname and entry in the private DNS zone file maintained on the internal
network name servers. The subject of this paper is the public Internet DNS.
To give an idea of the size and scope of the public Internet DNS: A survey completed in
January 2010 found 86,521,299 domain names and 106,044 DNS servers on the Internet
(Internet Software Consortium, 2010).
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A DNS Query
These are the steps that occur in a typical DNS query for a Windows client that attempts
to visit the web site www.regis.edu using a web browser (see Figure 2). The Windows client first
checks its local resources (local cache, local hosts file) to determine if it already knows the IP
address for www.regis.edu. If not, it issues a DNS query to the IP address configured in its
TCP/IP configuration as its DNS server. The resolving/caching DNS server is typically a service
provided by the local Information Technology department or the Internet Service Provider. The
resolving/caching DNS server checks to see if it is authoritative for the regis.edu zone. If not, it
checks its local cache to see if it already knows the answer to the query. If not, it either forwards
the query to another DNS server or it uses recursion to look up the answer (Davies, 2006).
Meanwhile, the Windows client is waiting for a response.
A DNS server that is configured to use recursion has a list of “root hints”, which is a list
of IP addresses of name servers for the DNS root “.”. The name server randomly chooses a root
server from its list and queries the root server if it knows the IP address for www.regis.edu. The
root server checks its cache and whether it is authoritative for regis.edu. The answer is no.
However, the root server has delegations for the TLDs including .edu. The root server responds
with a referral to a name server for the .edu TLD. The resolving/caching name server receives
the referral and then queries the .edu TLD name server if it knows the IP address for
www.regis.edu. The .edu TLD server checks its cache for the answer and whether it is
authoritative for regis.edu. The answer is no. However, the .edu server has delegations for all
.edu domains including regis.edu. The .edu server responds with a referral to the authoritative
name server for regis.edu. The resolving/caching name server receives the referral and then
queries the authoritative name server for regis.edu if it knows the IP address for www.regis.edu.
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The regis.edu name server knows the answer. It responds that www.regis.edu is 207.93.211.100.
The resolving/caching name server adds the answer to its local cache and forwards the answer to
the Windows client (Liu & Albitz, 2006, pp. 27-30). The Windows client adds the answer to its
local cache, gives the answer to the web browser, and the web browser uses this information to
successfully navigate to the web site. All of these steps occur within milliseconds (Davies,
2006).
DNS records have a “time to live” (TTL). The TTL determines how long the record
should remain the in the cache of a client or caching name server. The administrator for the
authoritative name server for regis.edu configures TTL for www.regis.edu. In Windows, the
command to view the local DNS cache is “ipconfig /displaydns”. Figure 3 shows the results
including how many seconds the record has remaining in the local cache (approximately 10
hours).

Figure 3. TTL for www.regis.edu.
The next time this Windows client attempts to visit www.regis.edu, as long as it is within
the TTL period, it will have the IP address for the web site in its local cache and it will not need
to issue a DNS query (Davies, 2006). If a different Windows client queries the caching name
server for www.regis.edu within the TTL period, the caching name server will respond with the
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answer from its cache and it will not use recursion to find the answer. If the administrator for
regis.edu changes the IP address for www.regis.edu it will take time for the change to propagate
around the Internet, because any client or server with the old IP address in its cache will wait for
the TTL on the old record to expire before it discovers the new record (Liu & Albitz, 2006, pp.
34-36).
DNS Security Vulnerabilities
The DNS is vulnerable to attack by malicious persons in several ways. Hacking and
cracking on the Internet is no longer simply the work of vandals or pranksters. Malicious persons
are motivated by greed and profit to take advantage of security vulnerabilities. Money in bank
accounts, available through fraudulent web-based transactions, is a prime target. The DNS may
be attacked at the authoritative servers, caching servers, or the network communication links.
IETF RFC 3833 (Atkins & Austein, 2004) outlines a catalog of threats to the DNS.
The “Kaminsky” vulnerability – cache poisoning.
In July 2008, security researcher Dan Kaminsky publicly reported on a vulnerability that
was present in all major DNS server software. The vulnerability is due in part to the DNS server
software simply following the DNS specifications. The Kaminsky vulnerability is in caching
resolvers—the DNS servers at Internet Service Providers that resolve recursive DNS queries on
behalf of clients and then “remember” the answers in the cache for a period of time (the TTL).
The attacker uses this vulnerability to “poison” the cache with invalid data. Clients of a DNS
server with a poisoned cache will be redirected to the attacker’s web site. The attack can be used
as part of a phishing scheme (The Internet Infrastructure Foundation, n.d.).
A caching DNS server that does not already have the answer to a query in its cache uses
recursion to resolve the query. The goal of an attacker is to interfere with the communication
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between the resolver and the DNS servers it is querying, providing invalid information before the
response comes back from the valid DNS server. If the attacker is successful, when the valid
response comes back the caching resolver will drop the valid response as a duplicate (The
Internet Infrastructure Foundation, n.d.).
When DNS servers communicate with each other, they use a 16-bit transaction ID to
validate the response they receive back. A 16-bit transaction ID means the transaction ID can be
between 1 and 65,536 (base 10). Thus, an attacker sending spoofed responses to a caching
resolver has about a 1 in 65,000 chance of guessing the correct transaction ID. Kaminsky also
observed that the transaction ID used by some DNS servers is less than random. Some DNS
servers use sequential transaction IDs, making it easy to guess the next one. An attacker can
automate the process of issuing cache poisoning attempts, and with enough time can successfully
guess a valid transaction ID and poison a DNS server’s cache. With current computing power (an
attacker controlling a single computer), a successful attack on a vulnerable DNS server generally
takes only a few minutes. Freely available software exists to automate cache poisoning attacks,
so an attacker does not need any specialized knowledge or skill (The Internet Infrastructure
Foundation, n.d.).
Kaminsky coordinated his July 2008 announcement with the major DNS server software
vendors. The vendors immediately issued patches to protect against the vulnerability. Patched
DNS servers use TCP source port randomization in addition to the transaction ID to validate
responses. This technique effectively increases the entropy of the transaction ID from 16 bits
(about 1 in 65,000) to 32 bits (about 1 in 4,000,000,000). Networking restrictions may prevent
DNS servers from using the full range of TCP source ports, so even patched servers do not
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necessarily benefit from the full 32 bits of entropy. Of course, not all DNS servers have been
patched (The Internet Infrastructure Foundation, n.d.).
The additional entropy makes an attacker’s job much more difficult, but still not
impossible. With current computing power, what used to take an attacker with a single computer
only a few minutes would now take months to accomplish (The Internet Infrastructure
Foundation, n.d.). An attacker with additional computing power—perhaps commanding a botnet
consisting of thousands of computers—could pull off a successful cache poisoning attack against
a patched DNS server within a reasonable amount of time. The botnet threat is not merely a
theoretical possibility (Rajab, Zarfoss, Monrose, & Terzis, 2006).
Man in the Middle – Packet Interception.
The “man in the middle” attack requires that the attacker has physical access to the
network between the DNS client and DNS resolver or the network between DNS servers. The
attacker intercepts communications and inserts his own responses in place of the valid responses
(Atkins & Austein, 2004, pp. 3-4).
Physical access to the network is the primary barrier to carrying out a “man in the
middle” attack. A corrupt employee of an Internet Service Provider, phone company, or cable
company would have the necessary physical access. Software and hardware exists to facilitate
and automate such an attack. With physical access, carrying out this attack is relatively easy
(Callegati, Cerroni, & Ramilli, 2009).
Untrustworthy DNS server.
This vulnerability is due to the fact that the DNS infrastructure involves interaction with
DNS servers that are controlled by neither the DNS client nor the administrators of the DNS
zone that the client wishes to query. Intermediary DNS servers at the local premises (business,
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coffee shop, hotel, airport, etc.), Internet Service Provider, the TLDs, and the root are all
potential servers that could be untrustworthy. Travelers with mobile devices (laptops, smart
phones) often have little or no control over what DNS servers their device uses. Any DNS server
in the chain could have corrupt data, either by accident or intentionally (Atkins & Austein, 2004,
pp. 7-8). For example, an Internet Service Provider could have a commercial motivation to use
DNS to redirect traffic away from their competitor.
Vulnerabilities in the underlying operating system could be considered a subset of the
“untrustworthy DNS server” category. Any DNS server relies on its underlying operating system
for its operation. An attacker who can obtain “root” access to a Unix server can control any
services running on that server, such as BIND DNS. An attacker who can attain “Administrator”
access to a Windows server can in turn control the DNS server service running on that server.
Denial of service.
In this attack, the goal of the attacker is to flood the target with requests, overwhelming
the target so that it is unable to respond to valid traffic from other clients. A more advanced
version of this attack is the distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack, where the attacker
commands a large number of hosts in a botnet to attack a target simultaneously (Atkins &
Austein, 2004, p. 8). Attackers have attempted D/DoS attacks against the DNS root servers. Root
servers have been resilient to these attacks (Castro, Wessels, Fomenkov, & Claffy, 2008).
An attacker’s motivation in a DoS or DDoS attack may be simple extortion. An attacker
may demonstrate his ability to carry out DoS, and then threaten a company with such an attack
unless they pay a ransom.
Example DNS attacks.
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In this hypothetical example, an attacker’s goal is to obtain login credentials of a bank’s
customers, and use the credentials to transfer money from the victim’s accounts into the
attacker’s offshore bank account. The attacker himself is located in Russia. The attacker sets up a
web server with a web site that has a login page that looks and functions just like the bank’s web
site. The attacker uses a botnet to attack a DNS resolver/caching server at a major Internet
Service Provider in the United States (Kaminsky cache-poisoning attack). The attacker
successfully poisons the target DNS server with a DNS record that redirects clients to the
attacker’s web site. Customers of the ISP attempt to visit their bank web site, but the poisoned
DNS server redirects the customers to the attacker’s web site which looks just like the real site.
When the customers enter their login credentials, the login appears to fail, which is confusing to
the customers. In fact, the customers are providing their usernames and passwords to the
attacker. Before the customers realize what is happening, the attacker uses their login credentials
to log into the victim customers’ accounts and transfer funds to the attacker’s offshore account.
This attack is able to continue until someone reports the problem to the ISP and the ISP clears
the compromised DNS server’s cache, or until the TTL on the poison DNS record expires.
In this hypothetical example, the attacker is a manufacturing firm in China. The
manufacturing firm wishes to spy on a U.S. competitor’s e-mail traffic to gain trade secrets and a
competitive advantage. The attacker is motivated by profit—millions of dollars’ worth of
business is at stake. The attacker uses a hidden identity (free Gmail account and a debit card
purchased with cash) to set up a caching mail server with a legitimate service provider. The
attacker uses public records to determine where the U.S. competitor’s authoritative DNS servers
are hosted. The attacker bribes an employee of the DNS service provider $50,000 (a year’s salary
for the employee) to place an invalid MX record in the company’s DNS zone (untrustworthy
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DNS server attack). The invalid MX record redirects all incoming e-mail for the victim company
to the caching mail server. The caching mail server saves a copy of all incoming e-mail before
forwarding the mail to the victim’s mail server. Employees of the victim company continue to
receive incoming mail as normal. The attack continues until someone at the victim’s company
happens to notice the invalid MX record in their DNS zone or happens to notice that all
incoming mail is originating from a single IP address (the attacker’s caching mail server) and
investigates why.
DNS Security Extensions
DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) provides a layer of security on top of standard
DNS. DNSSEC uses public-key cryptography to permit consumers of DNS data to authenticate
the validity of DNS queries. DNSSEC authentication protects against the threats of cache
poisoning attacks, man in the middle attacks, and untrustworthy DNS servers. The original
DNSSEC specification (RFC 2065) was published in 1997 (Eastlake & Kaufmann, 1997). That
specification was updated in 1999 by RFC 2535 (Eastlake, 1999). The IETF published major
revisions to the DNSSEC specifications in 2005 with RFCs 4033, 4034 and 4035 (Arends et al.,
2005). These three RFCs define the current basic DNSSEC standard.
DNSSEC-aware DNS servers and DNSSEC signed zones are fully backwards-compatible
with non-DNSSEC aware DNS servers and clients. DNSSEC adds additional data to a DNS zone
(a significant quantity of new data, in fact), but modifies none of the existing data in a DNS
zone. A non-DNSSEC aware resolver will simply not query for the DNSSEC-related data
(Arends et al., 2005).
DNSSEC uses asymmetric encryption to authenticate and validate DNS queries.
Asymmetric encryption algorithms use a pair of encryption keys—one private and one public.
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The asymmetric algorithms and keys permit one person to encrypt data using a private key, and
only the public key that is paired with the private key is capable of decrypting the data. It is a
best practice to keep the private key offline and secure, to ensure that no unauthorized person
may ever use it to sign invalid data. The longer the keys, the more difficult it would be for a
malicious person to crack the encryption and compromise the private key (Arends et al., 2005;
Liu & Albitz, 2006, pp. 323-326).
The administrator of a DNS zone generates an asymmetric public/private key pair. The
public key is published in the zone file as a DNSKEY record. The administrator should keep the
private key offline and physically secure at all times. No one other than the owner of the DNS
zone should have access to the private key, preventing any other party from forging DNS data
and signing it with the private key (Kolkman & Giebman, 2006; Liu & Albitz, 2006, pp. 336
337; Microsoft, 2009, pp. 62-63).
The administrator uses the private key and a software-based utility to “sign” the DNS
zone. Ideally, the administrator performs the signing operation offline. The signing process
generates special resource records within the zone called RRSIG records. The RRSIG records
contain a hash value of DNS data generated using the private key. The original DNS records
remain in the zone file in their unencrypted form. Only the published public key which is the
other half of the private/public key pair will generate the same hash value, thus validating the
authenticity of the DNS data (Kolkman & Giebman, 2006; Liu & Albitz, 2006, pp. 336-342;
Microsoft, 2009). Figures 5-9 in Appendix A show an example DNSSEC-signed zone file.
DNSSEC requires a secure method for validating the public key. Otherwise, if someone
has access to the zone file they could generate their own public/private key pair and generate
invalid signed data. DNSSEC uses a “chain of trust” mechanism to validate public keys. The
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public key for a zone is itself signed and validated by a higher authority (Arends et al., 2005).
The chain of trust follows the same hierarchy as the DNS tree, so a parent zone validates the
public keys of its child zones. The parent zone enters a DS (delegation signer) record for the
child zone which contains the child zone’s public key. The parent zone signs the DS record with
its own private key (Arends et al., 2005; Kolkman & Giebman, 2006).
If DNSSEC were implemented universally, each parent zone would validate its child
zones’ keys, and only a single public key at the DNS root—a key that is widely known and
trusted—would be needed as an entry point into the chain of trust (Arends et al., 2005). In
practice, DNSSEC is not implemented universally. The DNS root zone is not yet signed. Only
some TLDs are signed, providing a trusted root for zones within the TLD. Isolated segments of
the DNS tree with no authoritative parent operate as “islands of security”. Each “island of
security” must provide an independent, secure means for distributing its trusted root key to
partners that wish to use DNSSEC validation. The administrator of each DNSSEC-enabled
resolver must maintain a list of Trusted Root keys locally on the DNS server (Liu & Albitz,
2006, pp. 330-333; Microsoft, 2009, pp. 65-66).
The strength of asymmetric cryptography is dependent in part on the key length. Longer
keys are more difficult to crack. However, the tradeoff is that longer keys require more
processing power to encrypt and decrypt data, and more storage space for the larger DNSKEY
and RRSIG records (Chandramouli & Rose, 2006). DNSSEC uses the RSA asymmetric
encryption algorithm. RSA uses 512 to 4,096 bit length keys. RSA with a 2048-bit key is
estimated to be un-crackable until the year 2035. RSA with a 3072-bit key is estimated to be un
crackable for the foreseeable future (Lee, Malkin, & Nahum, 2007, p. 86). DNSSEC operations
anticipate rotating encryption keys on a regular basis—every few months (Liu & Albitz, 2006, p.
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336). RSA encryption with 2048-bit or 3072-bit keys provides a very strong solution for
DNSSEC authentication and validation—much stronger than the 32 bits of entropy provided by
source port randomization.
Signing a zone with DNSSEC also generates another new record type—NSEC records.
NSEC records are used to authenticate non-existence of a queried record. The signing process
generates a NSEC record for each gap between records that exist in the zone. After the last
record in a zone, the last NSEC record “loops” back to the beginning of the zone file. When a
client queries for a non-existent record “M”, they will receive an authenticated response in the
form of an NSEC record which states in effect “there are no DNS records between “L” and “P”
(Arends et al., RFC 4034, 2005; Liu & Albitz, 2006, pp. 328-330).
The new problem introduced by the existence of NSEC records is that they make it easy
to enumerate the entire contents of a signed zone. Many DNS administrators consider this is a
significant problem, even though DNS data is by design public and not intended to be private.
Before the existence of NSEC records it would be necessary to use brute force to enumerate a
zone—querying a zone for all possible values to see what responses the server returns. In
comparison to that time-consuming process, NSEC records make it trivial to enumerate a zone
(Liu & Albitz, 2006, p. 330).
In response to concerns raised by NSEC records, RFC 4470 defines an alternative called
“minimal spanning NSEC RRs” (Weiler & Ihren, 2006; Rose & Nasassis, 2008). This method
requires the DNS server to dynamically generate NSEC records on the fly, in response to specific
queries. A more widely-accepted alternative, RFC 5155 defines the NSEC3 record (Laurie,
Sisson, Arends & Blacka, 2008). NSEC3 records are hashed NSEC records. Hashing the NSEC
records provides authenticated non-existence without revealing the exact range of records which
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do not exist (Laurie et al., 2008). Minimal spanning NSEC RRs or NSEC3 records enable
authenticated non-existence without exposing a zone to the risk of easy enumeration. However,
NSEC3-signed zones are not fully backwards-compatible with older DNSSEC servers that do not
support RFC 5155. Non-NSEC3-compatible DNSSEC servers will be able to resolve queries for
NSEC3 signed zones, but will treat the NSEC3 signed zones as “insecure” (Laurie et al., 2008;
Rose & Nasassis, 2008).
DNSSEC Administration
Administering a DNSSEC signed zone requires knowledge of DNS, asymmetric
encryption keys, and new tools for managing keys and signing zones (Kolkman & Giebman,
2006; Liu & Albitz, 2006, pp. 322-348).
The administrator of an authoritative zone must generate encryption keys and roll over
the encryption keys on a regular schedule. The generally-accepted practice is to generate two sets
of keys—key signing keys (KSK) and zone signing keys (ZSK). The purpose of managing two
sets of keys is that it makes it possible to use different key lengths and key lifetimes. The KSK
set uses a longer key and therefore has a longer expected lifetime. The zone administrator
provides the public KSK to the administrator of the parent DNS zone. Since interactions with
third parties (i.e. the parent zone administrator) are more time-consuming and expensive than
self-administration, the KSK changes less frequently than the ZSK. The ZSK uses a shorter key
for faster performance, but has a shorter lifetime (Liu & Albitz, 2006, pp. 335-342; Microsoft,
2009, pp. 62-64). The zone administrator might roll over (change) the ZSK every 3 months,
compared to a 12-month lifetime for a KSK. (These timeframes are only examples and are not
required by the DNSSEC standard.)
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The zone administrator must have knowledge of the procedures and technical tools used
to generate and manage the encryption keys. Private keys should be kept offline in secure
physical storage at all times. Public keys are published in the zone file. Every time new keys are
generated (KSK or ZSK), the zone administrator must publish the public keys in the zone file
and re-sign the zone with the new private keys. When new KSKs are generated, the zone
administrator must provide the parent zone administrator with a copy of the public key and wait
for the parent zone administrator to publish and sign the new DS record (Liu & Albitz, 2006, pp.
335-342; Microsoft, 2009, pp. 62-64).
DNSSEC encryption keys have a limited lifetime. The administrator must perform key
rollover operations before the old encryption keys expire. Otherwise, DNSSEC validation will
fail.
Whenever a DNS administrator adds, deletes, or modifies records in a DNSSEC-signed
zone, the administrator must re-sign the zone with the private key. Dynamic update, where hosts
are able to dynamically update their DNS records, is no exception. If that feature is enabled on
the DNS server, every dynamic DNS update also requires re-signing the zone with the private
key. Thus, enabling dynamic update with DNSSEC requires making the private encryption key
available to the DNS server software. As mentioned earlier, it is a best practice from a security
standpoint to keep the private key offline in physically secure storage (Liu & Albitz, 2006, p.
340; Microsoft, 2009, p. 68).
The administrator of a DNS caching server that is DNSSEC-enabled must manage the list
of trust anchor (or secure entry point) keys. The administrator must keep track of the valid
lifetime of each trust anchor and update the trust anchors as needed. Failure to update trust
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anchor keys will cause DNSSEC validation to fail when the keys expire (Liu & Albitz, 2006, p.
332; Microsoft, 2009, p. 65).
DNSSEC Problems
If DNSSEC solves a real problem, why is it not immediately and widely adopted? Before
adopting any technology, most rational persons first evaluate the associated costs and benefits.
Even though DNSSEC has been available for more than a decade, the anticipated costs have
apparently outweighed the perceived benefits, and adoption has been slow. Some, but not all,
TLDs are signed. The root zone is not yet signed (Osterweil, Massey, Ryan, & Zhang, 2008;
Osterweil, Massey, Ryan, & Zhang, n.d.; Westervelt, 2009).
Problem: DNSSEC doesn’t extend to the client.
How does the end user know that DNSSEC is working? The DNSSEC specifications
describe a method for DNS servers to authenticate DNS queries. The specifications do not
include a method for the DNS client to authenticate DNS queries, or for providing any type of
feedback to the end user. Applications such as web browsers do not provide DNSSEC-related
feedback to the end user. This is in contrast to other security features, such as SSL. For example,
a user visiting a web site that is protected by SSL can typically see “https” in the address bar and
a padlock somewhere in the browser interface. DNSSEC has no mechanism to provide such
feedback to the end user (Fratto, 2009).
One could argue that the end user doesn’t need to know whether DNSSEC is working at
the server level. In the case of a bogus DNS entry, DNSSEC protects the end user by failing to
resolve the query. Some believe that from an end user’s point of view, it is in fact useful to know
that a security feature is working. Feedback to the end user would “close the loop” of
communication between the DNS administrator that created the DNS records and signed their
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zone, and the end user who issues a query against that DNS zone. Whether or not it provides any
“real” additional security, feedback to the end user would provide a feeling of security (Schneier,
2008). Consider the Extended Validation (EV) SSL certificates that turn the address bar green in
the Internet Explorer and Mozilla Firefox web browsers. EV certificates provide no better
encryption than non-EV certificates containing encryption keys of the same length. Nevertheless,
merchants pay a high premium to purchase EV certificates because they believe it makes their
customers feel more secure to see the green bar. If DNSSEC had a mechanism for providing user
feedback, it may encourage more online merchants to consider DNSSEC as a marketing tool in
addition to a security option (Fratto, 2009).
Problem: DNSSEC is difficult to administer.
Deploying DNSSEC involves several steps including generating encryption keys, signing
a zone, key management, key rollover, and key distribution. Each step is manually done by a
system administrator. It is time-intensive and error-prone. Administering DNSSEC requires
specialized skill and knowledge that is not widely available (Friedlander, Mankin, Maughan, &
Crocker, 2007; Chandramouli & Rose, 2006).
Consider the steps for deploying DNSSEC for the first time for a zone: First, the DNS
administrator generates encryption keys. The general practice is to use two sets of encryption
keys, key signing keys and zone signing keys. The DNS administrator uses a software utility to
generate the two key sets. The DNS administrator adds the key sets to the zone. The DNS
administrator uses a software utility to sign the zone. The DNS administrator replaces the
unsigned zone file with the signed zone file. The DNS administrator updates the DNS server
configuration to tell the DNS server that the zone is DNSSEC enabled. The DNS administrator
provides a copy of the key signing key to the administrator of the parent zone via a secondary
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and secure communication method, such as encrypted e-mail. The administrator of the parent
zone must include the key signing key from the child zone in the parent zone file. This is where
the administration of DNSSEC becomes complicated and un-scalable. The administrative burden
on the administrators of the .com TLD would be significant even if a small percentage of .com
domain name holders decided to sign their zones. An automated system would be necessary to
make DNSSEC administration scalable (Chandramouli & Rose, 2006; St Johns, 2007).
Zone-signing is an on-going administrative task. Every time a record is modified, added
or removed from the zone, the DNS administrator must re-sign the zone and re-load the zone file.
The best practice from a security perspective is to keep the private encryption keys offline. If that
practice is followed, every zone re-signing requires four manual steps: copying the modified
zone file to the offline system, signing the modified zone, copying the signed zone file back to
the DNS server system, and re-loading the zone file. BIND DNS does support dynamic updates
with DNSSEC, but dynamic update requires a security compromise of keeping the private
encryption key on the DNS server system so that it is available to the server for dynamic re
signing (Liu & Albitz, 2006; Microsoft, 2009).
Key rollover is an on-going administrative task. The DNS administrator must periodically
generate new KSKs and ZSKs. The DNSSEC RFCs do not require a compliant DNS server to
warn the DNS administrator when the encryption keys are nearing the end of their lifetime. If the
DNS administrator loses track of the encryption key rollover schedule, encryption keys expire,
and DNSSEC validation will fail. Every time a key is rolled-over, this requires re-signing the
zone with the new keys. When the ZSK is rolled over, it also requires interaction with the DNS
administrator for the parent zone, and action on the part of the parent zone DNS administrator
(Liu & Albitz, 2006; Microsoft, 2009).
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RFC 4986 describes the following requirements for automated Trust Anchor key
management (Eland, Mundy, Crocker, & Krishaswamy, 2007): 1. Scalable to meet the demands
of the Internet. 2. No intellectual property limitations (i.e., free/open source). 3. General
applicability (works with any signed zone). 4. Supports private networks. 5. Detects stale
(expired) Trust Anchors. 6. The operator may choose between manual or automated operation. 7.
Permits both planned and unplanned key rollovers. 8. Permits timely (quick) distribution of Trust
Anchors. 9. Highly available. 10. Supports new RR types. 11. Supports Trust Anchor
maintenance (additions, deletes, replacement). 12. Supports recovery from compromise. 13.
Ensures authenticity and integrity during key rollover operations. One of the purposes of this
thesis is to evaluate whether Microsoft Windows Server 2008 R2 DNSSEC meets any of these
requirements.
Administrative tools provided with DNS server software to date do not scale well.
DNSSEC specifications do not provide specific standards for administrative tools, so it is up to
each vendor to create its own tools. Most are command-line tools. Documentation is sparse.
Troubleshooting tools are lacking.
Reverting to an unsigned zone is not a straightforward task.
Problem: zone content privacy / zone enumeration.
The base DNSSEC specifications (RFCs 4033, 4034 and 4035) provide for validated
negative responses through the use of NSEC records. A side effect of this new feature is the
ability to trivially enumerate the full contents of a zone. This practice is called zone-walking.
Some DNS administrators consider this a significant security/privacy risk.
There are currently three separate approaches to deal with the zone-walking concern: One
approach is the use of NSEC3 records instead of NSEC records (RFC 5155). Another approach
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is the use of “minimal-spanning NSEC RRs” (RFC 4470). A third approach is to use split-DNS,
keeping private DNS data out of the public DNS (Rose, 2008).
NSEC3 is not backwards-compatible with NSEC. DNS servers that are not NSEC3
compatible cannot validate zones that are signed with the NSEC3 option and will treat the zones
as insecure.
Problem: lack of top-level signed zones.
The root zone is not yet signed and only a handful of TLDs are signed (Friedlander,
Mankin, Maughan, & Crocker, 2007; Osterweil, 2008). This situation leads to many “islands of
security” and makes DNSSEC administration more difficult for the administrators of validating
name servers. Many islands of security means it is necessary to configure many trusted anchors.
A workaround for the lack of signed TLDs is to use DNSSEC Lookaside Validation
(DLV) as defined in RFCs 4431 and 5074 (Andrews, 2006; Weiler, 2007). DLV is a mechanism
for publishing DNSSEC trust anchors outside of the DNS delegation chain. Trust anchors could
be consolidated somewhere other than the parent zone. For example, the trust anchor for
“example.com” could be hosted by the DLV service provider at “dlv.isc.org” instead of its parent
zone “.com”. DLV opens up the possibility for commercial service providers to take on
responsibility for maintaining trust anchors, instead of or in addition to the TLD administrators.
Problem: additional system overhead.
In comparison to standard DNS, DNSSEC-signed zones require additional disk storage
space, network bandwidth, and processor cycles to operate. The additional overhead is
significant. The size of a signed zone increases by approximately 4 times compared to an
unsigned zone. The longer the chain of trust, the more processing is needed to validate the
response to a query (Liu, 2006, p. 335). The additional system overhead makes operating DNS
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more expensive. Additional overhead makes the DNS more vulnerable to distributed denial of
service (DDoS) attack (Arends et al., 2005).
Problem: perceived lack of concrete threat.
Some argue that DNSSEC is a solution looking for a problem. There are greater risks on
the Internet than risks of DNS-related security vulnerabilities. Some examples of the larger
threats are application-layer risks, SPAM, and phishing. One could argue that it is more rational
to allocate resources towards finding solutions these larger threats, rather than spending limited
resources on DNSSEC. One could argue that current workarounds for DNS vulnerabilities—such
as source port randomization—are simply “good enough”. DNSSEC advocates would counter
than the threats to DNS are real and therefore should be a high priority (see infra, Chapter 2,
DNS is a Critical Service, DNS Security Vulnerabilities).
When considering whether to deploy new security measures, it is rational to consider the
costs and benefits of doing so (Gibson, 2009). In light of the low adoption rates, it is logical to
conclude that the perceived threats that DNSSEC protects against are not great enough to justify
the administrative costs of deploying DNSSEC.
Consider this from the perspective of a bank operating a web site where its customers can
conduct financial transactions. If a DNS cache poisoning attack redirects its customers to a
phishing site, the customers should be alerted to the counterfeit nature of the site by noticing the
invalid SSL certificate. If the customer falls for the phishing scam anyway, and gives its login
credentials to the attacker, is the bank liable for the customer’s mistake? If so, what are the
projected costs of reimbursing clients for DNS-related phishing scams compared to the projected
costs and benefits of deploying DNSSEC?

EVALUATION OF MICROSOFT DNSSEC

26

Consider the perspective of a free e-mail provider, such as Gmail. A DNS cache
poisoning attack could permit an attacker to take over a number of Gmail accounts by publishing
false MX records that redirect gmail.com e-mail to the attacker’s mail server. In turn, the attacker
could reset the passwords on the victim’s web-based bank account through the e-mail
authentication loop. Then, the attacker could remove funds from the victim’s bank account. If
this scenario occurs, it seems unlikely that Google/Gmail could be held liable for the loss, even
though the sequence of events leading to the loss could have been blocked through the universal
use of DNSSEC to protect the Gmail mail servers’ MX records. In such a scenario, the loss to
Google/Gmail would likely be the loss of public confidence and damage to its reputation.
One way to change the results of the DNSSEC cost/benefit equation is to lower the
administrative costs associated with deploying DNSSEC. The other is if the perceived security
threats to DNS increase. Microsoft has an opportunity to influence the cost/benefit equation by
building user friendly DNSSEC administration tools into its operating systems. The
announcement of the Kaminsky vulnerability was an example of a change in threat perception.
After Kaminsky announced the real cache poisoning vulnerability in DNS in 2008, DNS
administrators scrambled to patch their servers with the latest updates to implement the source
port randomization workaround. Interest in DNSSEC also increased significantly after the
Kaminsky announcement (Morris, n.d.). The United States federal government mandated
adoption of DNSSEC in the aftermath of the Kaminsky vulnerability announcement (Evans,
2008; United States, 2009; Chandramouli & Rose, 2009).
Windows Server 2008 R2
Microsoft is a relatively new participant in the DNSSEC scene. The new Microsoft
operating systems, Windows 7 and Windows Server 2008 R2 (Release 2), include DNSSEC
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features. This is the first time Microsoft has offered DNSSEC support in a client operating
system, and the first time Microsoft has supported DNSSEC RFCs 4033, 4034 and 4035 in its
flagship server. Microsoft developed these two operating systems in parallel and released both on
July 22, 2009 (Rist, 2009; LeBlanc, 2009).
Microsoft Windows controls approximately 90% of the client operating system market
(NetMarketshare, 2010) and 74% of the server operating system market (Foley, Feb. 2010).
Because of this large market share, to what extent Microsoft supports a technology will have a
large influence on the adoption rates for the technology. The default settings Microsoft
configures in its client operating systems will have a large impact because most users will not
change the default. This is referred to as the “tyranny of the default” (Gibson, 2010). For
example, Microsoft Windows operating systems did not have a firewall enabled by default until
the release of Windows XP Service Pack 2. Changing the default to firewall enabled made a big
difference in the security posture for the majority of Windows users who accept the default
settings (Gibson, Jan. 2010).
DNSSEC support in Windows Server 2008 R2 is updated to comply with RFCs 4033,
4034, and 4035. This is the first version of Windows Server capable of signing a zone and
performing DNSSEC validation. In comparison, Windows Server 2003 and Windows Server
2008 provided only partial support for the now-obsolete DNSSEC specification RFC 2535.
Previous versions of Windows Server could not sign a zone, could host a signed zone only as a
secondary DNS server, and did not perform validation (Microsoft, 2009).
Windows Server 2008 R2 includes a new feature called the Name Resolution Policy
Table (NRPT). The NRPT is a group policy template that a system administrator can use to
centrally configure certain DNS settings for Windows 7 clients, including requiring DNSSEC for
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certain domain names. Group policy and the NRPT are available only in a Windows Active
Directory environment. The NRPT feature is not available for stand-alone Windows 7 clients.
Stand-alone Windows 7 clients must use the Windows registry to configure DNSSEC
(Microsoft, 2009).
Windows Server 2008 R2 includes many other technologies which have been part of the
Windows Server operating system for some time. These other technologies have the potential to
complement DNSSEC. “Dynamic DNS update” is the ability for network clients to automatically
add, modify or delete records in the DNS zone. “Secure DNS” is the ability to configure access
control lists (ACLs) on DNS zones and individual DNS records. The ACLs control which user or
computer accounts are able to make updates. “Active Directory-integrated DNS zones” leverage
the distributed multi-master Active Directory database, allowing DNS to use efficient Active
Directory replication to keep DNS servers in synch (Stanek, 2008, Ch. 23). “Microsoft Update”
and “Windows Server Update Services” offer automated methods for keeping the operating
system patched and up-to-date. For example, Microsoft uses Microsoft Update to distribute
trusted root certificates (Stanek, 2008, Ch. 2). Windows has an established reputation for
providing user-friendly graphical user interfaces and administration wizards. The Microsoft web
site www.microsoft.com offers a large library of support documentation (TechNet) and training
resources.
Windows 7
Windows 7 is the first “DNSSEC aware” client operating system from Microsoft. The
DNS client in Windows 7 is a “non-validating security-aware stub resolver” (Microsoft, 2009).
A “non-validating security-aware stub resolver” does not perform DNSSEC validation itself. It is
able to request DNSSEC validation from its DNS server. It is able to interpret responses from its
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DNS server to determine whether the response is DNSSEC validated. More specifically, the
client recognizes the “DO” bit in DNS responses. If the DNS client is expecting a validated
response, and the response is not validated, the DNS client will not forward the response to the
application (Microsoft, 2009). This provides an extra measure of security compared to a non
security-aware DNS client such as Windows XP or Windows Vista.
The Windows 7 DNS client relies upon its DNS server to perform validation. Therefore,
Microsoft recommends using IPSec to secure the network traffic between DNS client and server
(Microsoft, 2009). IPSec establishes a secure network connection, ensuring that the client is
communicating with a trusted DNS server. Without IPSec, there is a risk of a “man-in-the
middle” attack between the Windows 7 client and its validating DNS server.
In an environment that uses Windows Server 2008 R2 and Active Directory, Windows 7
DNS is also capable of being managed through group policy and the Name Resolution Policy
Template (NRPT). The NRPT feature enables system administrators to centrally configure and
manage DNSSEC settings for Windows 7 clients that are members of the Active Directory
domain. For example, a system administrator could configure a NRPT policy that requires all
Windows 7 clients on the company’s network to require DNSSEC validation for a specific DNS
domain (Microsoft, 2009).
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Chapter 3 – Research Questions

The purpose of this research is to test and evaluate whether DNSSEC functionality in
Windows Server 2008 R2 and Windows 7 is likely to change the cost/benefit analysis in favor of
deploying DNSSEC. Now that DNSSEC functionality is present in mainstream operating
systems, does this mean that DNSSEC will become a mainstream security feature? The research
will test basic functionality in the server operating system, test basic functionality in the client
operating system, test system administration features, and finally evaluate available
documentation.
The test lab is a fully-functioning installation of the subject operating systems. A detailed
description of the test lab is in Appendix A. The testing procedures are designed to gather
meaningful, objective data regarding DNSSEC functionality and administration in the subject
operating systems. The detailed test plan is in Appendix B.
Does DNSSEC in Windows Server 2008 R2 Work?
The purpose of this question is to evaluate whether the DNSSEC functionality in the
server operating system works as described in the Microsoft documentation. The results are
associated with test case 1 in the test plan (see Appendix B).
Does Windows Server 2008 R2 DNSSEC function as described in the Microsoft
documentation?
Microsoft documentation for installing and operating DNSSEC in Windows Server 2008
R2 is accurate. DNSSEC does function as described. The DNS server software in Windows
Server 2008 R2 successfully functions as an authoritative server for a DNSSEC signed zone. The
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dnscmd.exe utility successfully signs a zone. The DNS server service successfully hosts a signed
zone as a primary or secondary server.
The DNS server software successfully functions as a caching name server, and it
validates queries against signed zones when it has the needed trusted anchor installed. This is
true whether the authoritative DNS server is also a Windows Server 2008 R2 DNS server, and
when the authoritative DNS server is a Solaris 10 server running BIND 9.
Does Windows Server 2008 R2 address the zone enumeration problem?
The DNS server software does not address the zone enumeration problem. The software
does not support minimal spanning NSEC RRs as defined in RFC 4470 or NSEC3 resource
records as defined in RFC 5155. The DNS server software is not capable of signing a zone with
NSEC3. Microsoft specifically recommends against hosting a NSEC3-signed zone as a
secondary server (Microsoft, 2009). If a caching DNS server queries an authoritative zone that is
signed with NSEC3, it returns the response as “insecure”. This is not a total incompatibility. The
query does succeed. However, the security benefits of DNSSEC are not available to Windows
Server 2008 R2 for authoritative zones signed with NSEC3.
Does Windows Server 2008 R2 support DNSSEC lookaside validation?
DNS server software in Windows Server 2008 R2 does not support DNSSEC Lookaside
Validation (DLV) as defined in RFC 5074 (Weiler, 2007). Microsoft DNSSEC documentation is
silent on the topic of DLV. The lack of documentation for a feature does not mean that it not
present. An attempt to use a DLV trust anchor (dlv.isc.org) in Windows Server 2008 R2 failed,
verifying that the feature is not present.
How Does the DNSSEC Client Function in Windows 7?
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The purpose of this research question is to evaluate whether the DNSSEC functionality
Microsoft introduced in Windows 7 has effectively made DNSSEC an “end-to-end” solution. Is
DNSSEC functionality in Windows 7 likely to make DNSSEC more of a “mainstream” security
technology? The results are associated with tests 2 and 3 in the test plan (see Appendix B).
Does the DNSSEC client function as described in the Microsoft documentation?
The Windows 7 DNS client does function as described in the Microsoft documentation.
When Windows 7 is configured to require DNSSEC for a zone, the DNS client does provide a
response to the querying application when the response from the DNS server is validated (has the
DO bit set). In the same circumstances, the DNS client does not provide a response to the
application when the response is not validated (DO bit not set).
Does the DNSSEC client provide the end user actionable feedback?
The Windows 7 DNS client provides the end user with no actionable feedback in regard
to DNSSEC. The DNS client software does not appear to inform the querying application
whether or not DNSSEC validation is in effect. The result is that the end user receives no
feedback, positive or negative, regarding DNSSEC. When DNSSEC validation fails, the DNS
client simply does not provide a response to the application. It has no mechanism for explaining
why the query failed. No popup message appears on the screen. No system tray icon provides
feedback. No event is logged to any event log.
The lack of actionable feedback limits the utility of DNSSEC functionality in Windows
7. End users have become accustomed to receiving feedback from other security features such as
antivirus software, the Windows firewall and SSL. Antivirus software typically notifies the end
user with a pop-up message when a virus is detected. The Windows firewall notifies the end user
with a pop-up message when it blocks traffic from a new application. Web browsers provide the
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end user with positive feedback in the form of a padlock when SSL is in effect. Browsers provide
end users with negative feedback in the form of error messages when they detect SSL certificate
problems. In contrast, DNSSEC in Windows 7 either works or it doesn’t work. When DNSSEC
validation fails, the DNS client fails to provide a response to the application. But, a DNS query
failure could also have numerous other causes:
•

the end user may have made a typo in the hostname

•

local network connectivity may have failed

•

TCP/IP configuration may have an incorrect DNS server

•

TCP port 53 may be blocked somewhere between the DNS client and the DNS server

•

The DNS server may be experiencing a problem
The lack of negative feedback makes it difficult for the end user to positively determine

that a DNS query failure is due to a DNSSEC validation failure. One option is to reconfigure the
operating system to no longer require DNSSEC for the subject zone and try the query again. (If
the DNSSEC policy is configured through Active Directory group policy, this will require
involvement of a system administrator.) If the query succeeds without DNSSEC then the end
user has some evidence that DNSSEC validation is the problem. Another option is to use a
network packet capture tool such as Wireshark or Microsoft Network Monitor to capture the
DNS query and response packets. The captured packets will show whether or not the DO bit is
set in the DNS response. It is likely that an end user and/or the IT support staff would need to
spend significant time and effort troubleshooting a DNS query failure that is due to DNSSEC
validation failure.
The lack of positive feedback misses an opportunity for Windows 7 to enhance the
feeling of security. We use the word “security” to describe a feeling as well as a reality
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(Schneier, 2008). If Windows 7 provided positive feedback showing that DNSSEC validation is
working, this would result in an increased feeling of security in addition to the reality. The
increased feeling of security may in turn provide an additional incentive for companies to adopt
DNSSEC. An example of positive feedback that increases the feeling of security is the “green
bar” that appears in web browsers when the visited web site has an “extended validation” SSL
certificate installed. The extended validation SSL certificate provides no additional encryption
strength compared to a regular SSL certificate of the same key length. Most end users do not
know the difference between an extended validation certificate and a regular certificate, but they
do see the green bar. A site that displays the green bar is perceived to be more secure than a site
that does not display the green bar. Companies pay significant dollars for the extended validation
certificate because of the feeling of security that end users get from having the green bar appear
in their browsers. If DNSSEC provided similar feedback to the end user, companies could use it
as an additional differentiator for security-conscious end users.
Is the DNSSEC client easy to configure?
Windows 7 offers no user interface in the Start menu or in the Control Panel to configure
DNSSEC. Two options exist for configuring DNSSEC in Windows 7, and neither option could
be considered easy. Microsoft documentation states that the options are: 1. Use a Name
Resolution Policy Template (NRPT) and 2. Configure the Windows registry key at
[HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\DNSClient]
(Microsoft, 2009, pp. 79-85). The first option requires an existing Active Directory infrastructure
including Windows Server 2008 R2 domain controllers, network, and expertise to administer
those resources. This is a significant investment in software licensing, hardware, and technical
skills most likely to be present only in a corporate environment. The second option of
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configuring the registry is the only option for a stand-alone Windows 7 client. The
documentation provided for this option was found to be inadequate. See Figure 4 for a screenshot
of the relevant registry keys.

Figure 4. Screenshot of Windows 7 DNSSEC Registry Keys.
It is unlikely that more than a handful of enthusiasts will understand the documentation and
actually configure a stand-alone Windows 7 client to use DNSSEC. For all practical purposes,
the NRPT is the only option for configuring DNSSEC in Windows 7. The conclusion is that
DNSSEC in Windows 7 is available in a corporate network running Windows Server 2008 R2 in
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native mode (all domain controllers are upgraded to Windows Server 2008 R2). DNSSEC in
Windows 7 is not practical for stand-alone Windows 7 hosts.
Is DNSSEC Administration in Windows Server 2008 R2 User-Friendly?
The purpose of this research question is to evaluate whether the tools that Microsoft
provides to administer DNSSEC in Windows Server 2008 R2 ease the burden of DNSSEC
administration and thus reduce the costs associated with deploying and maintaining DNSSEC.
The results are associated with test 4 in the test plan (see Appendix B).
Is key administration user-friendly?
The first step in administering a DNSSEC-signed zone is to generate encryption key
pairs. Key management is an ongoing responsibility for the DNSSEC administrator. All tasks
associated with key management are described earlier in Chapter 2. Administrative tools in
Windows Server 2008 R2 do not make DNSSEC encryption key management particularly easy.
All DNSSEC encryption key administration in Windows Server 2008 R2 is performed
through the command line tool “dnscmd.exe”. Microsoft provides no graphical user interface for
administering DNSSEC encryption keys. There is no key generation wizard, key rollover wizard,
or key distribution wizard. The server provides no automated method for distributing encryption
keys to administrators of the parent zone. Microsoft Windows system administrators accustomed
to administering DNS server through the DNS server MMC console will need to learn the
command line tool dnscmd.exe. The DNS server MMC has no graphical interface for managing
the encryption key pairs. There is no tool for warning the system administrator when encryption
keys are about to expire, or to alert the administrator when it is time to perform a scheduled key
rollover.
Is zone signing user-friendly?
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Zone signing in Windows Server 2008 R2 is similar to key management. All tasks are
performed at the command line using dnscmd.exe. There is no graphical menu option or rightclick option in the DNS server MMC to sign a zone. DNS administrators accustomed to using
the graphical user interface will need to learn the command line tool dnscmd.exe. Furthermore,
other than the presence of the new record types, the DNS server MMC provides no visual
indication that a zone is signed.
Reverting to an unsigned zone is difficult. Microsoft’s recommendation for reverting to
an unsigned zone is to keep a backup of the unsigned zone and restore the backup if necessary
(Microsoft, 2009, p. 28). This recommendation does not take into account DNS record additions,
deletions and modifications that may have occurred in the intervening time between signing and
zone and reverting to the unsigned zone. In practice, reverting to an unsigned zone would most
likely require rebuilding the zone or manually deleting all DNSSEC-related records.
Is DNSSEC in Windows Server 2008 R2 integrated with other Windows features?
Windows Server 2008 R2 does not integrate DNSSEC with other key Windows features.
The Microsoft documentation states that dynamic updates are disabled on a signed active
directory integrated zone (Microsoft, 2009, p. 24). Testing also confirmed that when working
with a file-backed zone, the DNS server software does not automatically re-sign the zone when
records are updated. DNS dynamic update is not compatible with DNSSEC in Windows Server
2008 R2.
DNSSEC is not integrated with the “nslookup.exe” command line tool which is included
with Windows Server 2008 R2 (file version 6.1.7600.16385, 7/13/2009). The nslookup tool is
not “DNSSEC aware”. It provides no usable feedback, positive or negative, regarding whether
queries are validated. The tool is not useful for testing or troubleshooting DNSSEC. Figure 5
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shows the nslookup result for a query that yields a bogus answer due to an expired signature on
the authoritative DNS server. Enabling the “debug” or exhaustive debugging “d2” option in
nslookup also provides no DNSSEC-related information.

Figure 5. Screenshot of cryptic nslookup error.
DNSSEC is partially integrated with the DNS Server MMC snap-in. The DNS Server
“Properties” GUI has a new “Trust Anchors” tab where a DNS administrator can view, add, and
delete the public keys of trusted DNSSEC anchors. The DNS Server MMC does not have menu
options for generating encryption keys, signing (or re-signing, or un-signing) a zone, distributing
keys to the parent zone, or any DNSSEC administration tasks other than configuring trust
anchors. Other than the presence of the new resource records in the zone, the DNS Server MMC
provides no graphical indication to indicate that a zone is signed or unsigned. The new resource
records are visible in the MMC, and the GUI does display the new DNSSEC resource records in
a user-readable format if the DNS administrator double-clicks a record to open it (see Figure 6).
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Figure 6. Screenshot of RRSIG record from the DNS Server MMC.
DNSSEC is integrated with the Certificate Management MMC. When the dnscmd.exe
tool generates encryption keys, the associated certificates appear in the “Local Computer”
certificates store in the “MS-DNSSEC | Certificates” folder.
DNSSEC is not integrated with Microsoft Update or Windows Server Update Services.
Windows Server 2008 R2 does not enable DNS administrators to leverage the Windows Update
tool for key distribution. Key management for trusted anchors and for signed zones is a manual
task.
DNSSEC is partially integrated with the Windows Event Logs. Some events which one
might expect to generate an “Information” entry in the logs, but which in fact do not generate
entries in the logs, include: generating encryption keys, signing a zone, reasonable advance
warning of RRSIG records about to expire, and bogus DNS queries. One event which does
generate a useful “Error” entry in the Windows event logs is expired RRSIG records. This event
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appears in the DNS Server event log of the authoritative DNS server when a zone is loaded
containing expired signatures (See Figure 7). Note, the event does not appear in the log
immediately upon signature expiration when the DNS service is running—it appears when the
zone file is loaded or reloaded due to DNS service restart.

Figure 7. Screenshot of Event 1542 from the DNS Server event log.
Clicking the “Event Log Online Help” link in the event above (see Figure 7) opens the Microsoft
TechNet web site with a message “No results were found for your query”. DNS “debug” logging
is not an option to make up for the lack of DNSSEC related events in the Windows event logs.
Debug logging captures raw DNS data packets from the network interface; it does not log DNS
service-related events.
Does Windows Server 2008 R2 help prevent common DNSSEC mistakes?
The DNS Server software does not help a DNS administrator avoid the mistake of failing
to re-sign the zone after modifying records in a signed zone. The software does not automatically
re-sign the zone after the administrator modifies a record. Upon modifying a DNS record, the
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software provides no warning, such as a pop-up message stating “This zone is DNSSEC signed,
be sure to re-sign the zone after modifying the record!”.
Windows Server 2008 R2 provides the DNS administrator very little assistance in
preventing the mistake of allowing encryption keys to expire. The DNS server software does not
have an option to automatically generate new encryption keys and re-sign the zone before the old
encryption keys expire. The software does not generate any warnings in the DNS server MMC or
in the event logs to alert the DNS administrator of encryption keys that are nearing their
expiration date. The software does not generate an error upon expiration of encryption keys. The
software does generate an error when it loads a zone file containing an expired signature (see
Figure 7).
Is DNSSEC in Windows 7 and Windows Server 2008 R2 Well-Documented?
Test 5 of the test plan (see Appendix B) describes the methodology used to evaluate
DNSSEC documentation. The Windows 7 integrated Help and Support feature contains no
references to DNSSEC. The Windows Server 2008 R2 integrated Help and Support feature
contains one article that references DNSSEC. The title of the one article is “New Features in
DNS for Windows Server 2008 R2”. The help article does not explain how to configure
DNSSEC. The article does contain a link to the Microsoft TechNet web site. If one follows the
link and continues to follow links for more information, within three clicks one will find the
“DNSSEC Deployment Guide” on the TechNet web site (Microsoft, 2009). The DNS server
MMC help file in Windows Server 2008 R2 contains the same article as the operating system
Help and Support feature.
The Microsoft web site www.microsoft.com is a resource for Windows Server 2008 R2
and Windows 7 DNSSEC documentation. The TechNet library contains articles describing
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DNSSEC, how to deploy, and how to administer DNSSEC (Microsoft, 2009). The primary
document on deploying Microsoft DNSSEC is 85 pages (Microsoft, 2009). The document is
accurate and a useful guide for setting up DNSSEC. However, no documentation on the topics of
testing or troubleshooting DNSSEC in Windows 7 or Windows Server 2008 R2 was found.
The following hypothetical scenario illustrates a problem of the lack of DNSSEC
documentation: A DNS administrator who is knowledgeable of DNSSEC may configure an
authoritative zone to use DNSSEC. That administrator may leave the company and the company
hires a new DNS administrator to take over administering the server. DNSSEC is still a relatively
obscure security technology and the new administrator may not be aware of its existence. When
the new DNS administrator tries to administer the DNS server he or she will not recognize the
new record types. The DNS server MMC is not self-documenting in regard to DNSSEC and has
no references to DNSSEC. The administrator may not know the keywords to search for on the
Microsoft web site. The administrator will have great difficulty figuring out the purpose and
function of the new record types present in the zone. With no user-friendly tools or
documentation, the inexperienced administrator is likely to make mistakes that will adversely
impact DNSSEC functionality.
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Chapter 4 – Evaluate Potential Use Cases for Windows DNSSEC

In light of the above research results, how is Windows Server 2008 R2 and Windows 7
likely to perform in specific DNSSEC scenarios? A January 2010 survey of DNS server software
on the Internet found that 79% of the DNS servers on the Internet run BIND and 16% run
Windows (Internet Software Consortium, 2010). Does the new DNSSEC functionality in
Windows 7 and Windows Server 2008 R2 provide any incentives that might change those
numbers?
Authoritative Name Server Hosting a Signed Zone on the Internet
Windows Server 2008 R2 continues to lag behind BIND as a candidate for hosting
DNSSEC signed zones on the Internet. It is possible to host signed zones with Windows Server
2008 R2, but it lacks support for features present in the current BIND distributions (Internet
Software Consortium, n.d.). It does not support signing with NSEC3 and therefore leaves the
zone vulnerable to the “zone walking” vulnerability. Windows Server 2008 R2 has the cost of
software licensing, while BIND is open source. Administrative tools bundled with Windows
Server 2008 R2 give it no advantage compared to BIND.
Caching Name Server on the Internet
Windows Server 2008 R2 lags behind BIND as a candidate as a caching name server at
an Internet Service Provider. It is possible to use Windows Server 2008 R2 in this function, but it
lacks support for features present in BIND. Windows Server 2008 R2 does not support NSEC3
records. It will resolve queries against NSEC3-signed zones, however it will treat the zones as
“insecure”. It does not support DNSSEC Lookaside Validation. Windows Server 2008 R2 has
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the cost of software licensing, while BIND is open source. Administrative tools bundled with
Windows Server 2008 R2 give it no advantage compared to BIND.
Name Server on a Private Network Running Active Directory
DNSSEC validation functionality in Windows Server 2008 R2 is most likely to be used
in an Active Directory environment. In this scenario it is important to distinguish between
DNSSEC validation and hosting DNSSEC signed zones. In an Active Directory environment, the
authoritative Active Directory integrated zones are not likely to be signed because Windows
DNSSEC does not support dynamic DNS. Most large networks utilize DHCP and dynamic DNS.
A typical Active Directory environment uses the domain controllers as the authoritative DNS
servers for Active Directory integrated zones containing private DNS records. The Windows
domain clients are configured to use the domain controller/DNS servers as their primary DNS
servers. Typically, the domain controller/DNS servers forward DNS queries for external
resources to an outside DNS resolving/caching server. In such a scenario, the Windows
administrator may wish to use DNSSEC to validate lookups to the external caching server for
certain high-priority domains (e.g. banks, trusted partners). Of course, it is a prerequisite that the
high-priority domains are DNSSEC-signed. It is possible and reasonable to configure the Trusted
Anchors tab on the domain controller/DNS servers with the trusted anchors for the high-priority
domains.
This setup would protect the Windows domain clients if the caching DNS server at the
ISP were compromised due to the “Kaminsky” cache poisoning vulnerability. It would protect
the Windows domain clients from man-in-the-middle attacks and the untrusted DNS server
vulnerability. Any Windows domain client would benefit from this protection, not only Windows
7 clients, because the DNSSEC-enabled Windows DNS Server would refuse to pass along bogus
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DNS query results. In the event of a compromised caching name server, when a Windows client
attempts to visit the web site of the high-priority domain the query would simply fail, protecting
the client from the attack. However, taking the hypothetical scenario one step further, the
ungraceful failure would likely result in a phone call to the company help desk. Support staff at
the company help desk would have few tools at their disposal to troubleshoot the cause of the
failure. Furthermore, the system administrator who configured the trusted anchors on the internal
DNS server will need to manually monitor the configuration, periodically updating/replacing the
trusted anchors. Otherwise, if and when the high-priority trusted anchors change, name
resolution on the Windows 7 clients will fail, resulting in unnecessary downtime for company
employees trying to access the high-priority resources.
Windows 7 Active Directory Client
The preceding section described security benefits of enabling DNSSEC validation in an
Active Directory environment. In such an environment, Windows 7 clients offer the possibility
of adding an additional layer of security. In this scenario, it would be relatively easy to configure
the NRPT group policy settings so that Windows 7 domain clients would require DNSSEC
validation for the high-priority domains. This would protect the Windows 7 clients from the
possibility of a incorrectly configured or compromised domain controller/DNS server. It would
also protect mobile Windows 7 clients (laptops) when they are outside the private network. The
NRPT group policy settings could instruct the Windows 7 clients to require DNSSEC validation
for the high-priority domains even when they are outside of the private network. In such a
scenario, if the DNS servers in use are either compromised or do not support DNSSEC, queries
to the high-priority domains would fail. This scenario suffers from the same lack of
troubleshooting and testing tools.
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Windows 7 Stand Alone Client
It is technically possible, but unlikely that a Windows 7 stand alone client (not a member
of an Active Directory domain) will use DNSSEC. The documentation is inadequate. Windows 7
does not expose DNSSEC configuration through any user interface other than the Windows
registry (see Figure 4). The end user receives no meaningful feedback, positive or negative.
Troubleshooting and testing tools do not exist.
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Chapter 5 - Conclusions

Windows Server 2008 R2 and Windows 7 are not likely to contribute greatly to the
efforts to bring DNSSEC into the mainstream. DNSSEC is an obscure feature of the operating
systems and not fully integrated into existing Windows infrastructure. DNSSEC is complicated,
making the absence of testing and troubleshooting tools a significant weakness. Windows Server
2008 R2 and Windows 7 do not include administration or usability features that could
significantly change the cost/benefit analysis for most users considering whether to deploy
DNSSEC.
DNSSEC features in Windows Server 2008 R2 do not compare favorably to the dominant
DNS server software on the Internet, BIND. Windows Server 2008 R2 does not support the latest
DNSSEC features. Compared to BIND, Windows Server 2008 R2 has the additional cost of
software licensing, but it fails to counterbalance the licensing cost by offering advanced
administration tools.
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Appendix A – Test Lab

The Hardware Platform
The hardware platform for the virtual test lab is a Lenovo T500 notebook computer with
an Intel ® Core ™ 2 Duo 2.80 GHz 64-bit processor, 4.00 GB of RAM, and a 250 GB SATA
hard drive.
The Software Platform
The host operating system installed on the Lenovo T500 notebook is the 64-bit version of
Windows 7 Professional. Windows 7 has Internet access through a wireless network connection
to the author’s home network. The Internet Service Provider is Qwest.net DSL. The Qwest.net
DNS servers are at 205.171.2.65 and 205.171.3.65. Windows 7 is updated with all security
patches as of April 2010.
The virtual machine manager is Sun VirtualBox v. 3.1.6 r59338. The test lab has four
guest virtual machines configured to run in VirtualBox, as described in Table 1.
The three Windows virtual machines are configured as an Active Directory domain,
chlab.net. The domain controller has a group policy object configured with Name Resolution
Policy Table (NRPT) entries. The NRPT configuration requires that domain workstations request
DNSSEC validation for any queries in the zones secure.chlab.net and secure.chlab2.net (see
Figure 16).
The DNS Architecture
The test lab has three DNS Servers and three DNS zones, as described in Table 1 and
Figures 4-11. The key-signing key and zone-signing keys used to sign the secure.chlab.net have
the maximum 4096 bit length.
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Table 1: Test lab virtual machines
Hostname
Role

Operating
System

64-bit OS?
Allocated
Memory
Network Adapter
1 (uses NAT to
access external
resources, the
Internet)

Network Adapter
2 (internal
network for
virtual machines
to communicate
with each other)

WIN2K8R2DC1
Active Directory
Domain
Controller;
DNS Server;
Group Policy
Microsoft
Windows Server
2008 R2
Standard
version 6.1
(build 7600)
yes
1024 MB

WIN2K8R2MS1
Active Directory
Member Server;
DNS Server

WIN7
Active Directory
Domain
Member/Client

SOLARIS10
BIND DNS
Server

Microsoft
Windows Server
2008 R2
Standard
version 6.1
(build 7600)
yes
1024 MB

Microsoft
Windows 7
Professional
version 6.1
(build 7600)

Sun Solaris 10

yes
1024 MB

yes
768 MB

static IP
10.0.2.101 mask
255.255.255.0,
gateway 10.0.2.2
DNS [none]

static IP
10.0.2.102 mask
255.255.255.0
gateway 10.0.2.2
DNS [none]

static IP
10.0.2.103 mask
255.255.255.0
gateway 10.0.2.2
DNS [none]

static IP
10.0.20.101
10.0.20.111
10.0.20.112
10.0.20.113
mask
255.255.255.0
gateway [none]
DNS 10.0.20.101

static IP
10.0.2.104 mask
255.255.255.0
gateway 10.0.2.2
DNS
205.171.2.65
205.171.3.65
static IP
static IP
static IP
10.0.20.102
10.0.20.103
10.0.20.104
mask
mask
mask
255.255.255.0
255.255.255.0
255.255.255.0
gateway [none]
gateway [none]
gateway [none]
DNS 10.0.20.101 DNS 10.0.20.101 DNS [none]
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Table 2: Test lab DNS Servers and Zones
DNS Server
DNS Server software
DNS Server is primary
authoritative for:

DNS Server is
secondary
authoritative for:
DNS Forwarding
DNS Forwarders
DNS Recursion
DNS Caching
Trusted Anchors

WIN2K8R2DC1
Windows Server 2008
R2
chlab.net
(active directory
integrated zone)
secure.chlab.net
(signed, file backed
zone)
[none]

yes
205.171.2.65
205.171.3.65
enabled
enabled

WIN2K8R2MS1
Windows Server 2008
R2
[none]

SOLARIS10
BIND 9.3.6

[none]

[none]

yes
10.0.20.101

yes
205.171.2.65
205.171.3.65
enabled
enabled

enabled
enabled
secure.chlab.net
secure.chlab2.net

secure.chlab2.net
(signed zone)
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;
;
;
;
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Database file secure.chlab.net.dns for secure.chlab.net zone.
Zone version: 6

@
(

IN

SOA win2k8r2dc1.chlab.net. hostmaster.chlab.net.
6
900
600
86400
3600

;
;
;

serial number
refresh
retry
expire
default TTL

Zone NS records

@
;
;
;

;
;
;
;
) ;

NS

win2k8r2dc1.chlab.net.

MX
A
A

10
mail.secure.chlab.net.
10.0.20.111
10.0.20.112

Zone records

@
mail
www

Figure 8. Zone file for secure.chlab.net unsigned zone (1 KB).
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;
;
;
;
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Database file signed.secure.chlab.net for secure.chlab.net zone.
Zone version: 18

@
(

IN

SOA win2k8r2dc1.chlab.net. hostmaster.chlab.net.
18
900
600
86400
3600

;
;
;

@
@

@

serial number
refresh
retry
expire
default TTL

Zone NS records

@
;
;
;

;
;
;
;
) ;

NS

win2k8r2dc1.chlab.net.

Zone records

MX
10
mail.secure.chlab.net.
RRSIG SOA 5 3 3600 20100209215255 (
20100110215255 24645 secure.chlab.net.
mCogRCrz+DCWdNRiNgqYBYzk22tpRE3w6DWn
Yyx09EZ9YAYLQXwxgXS35zdCtIq4qkBsVo6b
bifs2WKvzh7+01NWlWvwICaBYE3MRIJPRw7n
UW9kUw+Okg4TP8rl6THMepZTfEnmm1cCQ0yv
bPhZN6gc6K5TJBTN6JLaWgrQJ8xfUO+DxYwS
IiKjeQS7EueykGKiHOUaIlWpT1J9PB+DYyBi
woiekeg35z3LrJI9rdmIB1DsFRIK92ztKlHS
1Be3PphLBaXxlvpIxBnMSPZEIRpGZ/+Yc2Zn
Uh6XXmT3i+VUG7UJOdCQFts3jSOwhxvYqGg7
YSf3RthHQqflksxsRvTb0Ot9ALRmK0b6bViO
AQi1z5Wlt9AT2MCHPNAAPAT4Kejdb1fIWL5z
KiPaMhDKcjzZprAwuiSanqk6hTyVpTP4oE1M
HO8dNOL2z3PcE5kT6hDxaynZg+PTm4zAJWhN
ISWhSqw8elmw6ttIVq4UiJfsSzTZOB2yBroc
tdNlvK5W72XgAKxwOu3JZIe/qRsbmqbPFbRX
wFgQtCLMvZJ0BzoT5VhJ727nj9rAc7ZfXWJL
8wlonRxpz7zc70mU9dTL9pdQo4aY0O7sPXJy
um+XkK/QpfsWDHj99GUCJ5iK1YfBpXNz5xz2
tScGJAijKlu9E+rITiZINwzRTOOSLzKg/bo=
)
RRSIG NS 5 3 3600 20100209215255 (
20100110215255 24645 secure.chlab.net.
c46C86e2HdSKN3MhnvL1Bf7naKmKUQNYSc0E
s4ZjhG5z6j+jp415ymlVepMqQEFhr0kNX+dH

Figure 9. Zone file for secure.chlab.net signed zone (16 KB), part 1 of 5.
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@

@

YU/nuLmPFOTZ2Rn7crvGws+BMUTC87hcIsjt
11fPB0xpszUB3heC0dsv+AICBzub5MHlUnxQ
GGDw+UO2wGQfMtj5lMq9wS1CWr9XgQqkLd/H
SCANi3QA8pWblCqCF8NgMFcpkNNpwJCwwI0c
5z7h4X2xiK5LNbEeg4r8wbTJmRS4kq3illOd
GMUA+evXWUWd+bmHBHsxo2pDpc7VMjJqNy8q
6MicWNr9v0tFYz/ZzZ/Ed2hf7lG9tr9cO0U=
)
RRSIG MX 5 3 3600 20100209215255 (
20100110215255 24645 secure.chlab.net.
pqktF6t1RILOwx7SrPiFLsqsMo+zoKmz/2Le
QXkoNiacyEz45h5NXvkAyK8xCNxdJJSiaoWx
ANxKtx+3FeHBdT43Dqd95+Li0vsY9tRrgLi+
cd5Hl6Xtf5+bQKgDkTBwL5rY6sFIQ6Z+ZIws
UtNZSQdfzEG981mST+OzP+47s5y90bIu1ncW
EV/DJ5HpLjjBQ6lr06MwthVN9b8OIFPQxbJU
c2oJiaU8gkUxryRqizBusIzzos5PgWVgY1Jt
fUCgLDE9xcAyLiECwA8AAgeh+JGVsb0/uYWa
H75wBn6GFNrom6SDODZKABX3+D9hFL0Ql/OD
xC3V79TgoJxqSH6FGYokjeRPAXe77NtHDOpQ
Erzcdcx1u8LDFyZr5U5eff3j6IWTcPrSNLP/
m9ekNG7bbMjlFsk+QLwU3VDXEkTREhnzUHoe
sNrbDP9DxFSwlJ5YGOeGtKdf1QP4UyrWdkwL
+cMt+7YRpf6s4nx6kYP1UiMw3djyO/2HKZjF
he8PFki62fQumGkWbTTfA0r2ntopqoBoCf2U
Wd7szjxUJ2y6zzTtvPodKg6XsiF8j7bvpyS0
ukkMnQbW7+WFaOh0nJcsyR5jTjZsILHgfU8a
d0NEk6Trbwn6DdJWx+gHt4J3xUBT9Dv797l8
5ANXHgYTz4GzoMtgKA4Bl+d54KE+tlLjEeA=
)
RRSIG NSEC 5 3 3600 20100209215255 (
20100110215255 24645 secure.chlab.net.
C981ejcXKzUZlf8cWm7scElR2FJBPSsTdG/g
QJgQ3oV2bRJKin2c/S17zoL3anx+2m4Pz1wS
XNRE5/9dwkw7yPhYUx2z+neCqb9bj6JcpUQM
+Qgj/3AWCNOGWruzQuQ99kuvu5wVVW6w5B0g
/sbqqlbHYpnQo2cyOt6oRYkNbW68uJxd0ug6
vgot32W5u1B/UxLYhdRudI3V9CHcApSIYL9R
TqBtQL6DtAgmgNjBSiwRwkLpz1Xg44jRwjHB
bxVDHgsStP9qWMCKKMYoAsdx90oTibJ/z9Kk
Iw0E2Hn285CJ4J8rL+8Af9d5/jopdxSH40cM
fnEAncJRq1tZ+9tAl2j81Lt8jXzWx46SVJ3r
JMODFW3irxxQpJrQq0NPgK8lshosa32QH9MZ
ZKzsDHUtafkvthF8+ZBoyYq7PfARByZKQkMe
UwV9CnIQGhT/A6j2HlX8MraXgYLTRyeyb94U
I4em3c16hHdL/NefdZuhToM+9+TF56xWktty
dlg5AqbxcYVZJKWekBfFViZ0QGi3xlKMdvgl
r3DiQndGPUqvnVv6+cPNbgmdmkANg9xqjszK
pcsD4DXjCYcjWcScHS/Viroqxb0rcjrZaZDL
fn8QRNF5PrlWcpLaMI9rRLDr9z1GM81lQxRm

Figure 10. Zone file for secure.chlab.net signed zone (16 KB), part 2 of 5.
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@

@
DNSKEY
@
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6iFQ4vI+ariZQX7O2jNWdXdOSCVszmC6rzBO
VAykaQG5BiUxwx65kI7qEFsdccqkU2Mq72zS
aZ6XxevfdCbSMMbv9+0MiB6Ojuoui/o4V+th
g4ZVxDXwGSYDeNCCqPS/mmu92U12uSC86z5f
9R9mYE1LshxB4iG1GAfPCV9KQ0g6lpjIYojX
S1CqyevvopiUEYajOtOBX8++iHq+o4J9KAu8
3QA6TUUZGsBDinUYDpO78EFYJL5IBnL0CxP5
+s+sUqRtXk+lZSVO9WvCzx73hjenPejyiOA0
2aeaTQjKaxp2B/YOsOgRZOno24ZlmbFGNWTD
GLzbORGksOz6S3a+0v6eUrRfhKeaW972ilsU
3a9Y+7jP/A6JJ/x0jqSw5VXxfZH8M8rHVs1B
Xe8JN2VAmyJE9nshcDXuSH1FF7d7aIct/nZj
NCqeNSNw0kiFrGQ+Z/nJ//db2pEcKrNTYs2E
D4ktMPpSAbvguJWrVcvIdc6bsILqPu+5FfQ=
)
RRSIG DNSKEY 5 3 3600 20100209215255 (
20100110215255 24645 secure.chlab.net.
aVyfdWxUwfkQSQAC/UFJdADwBCwCXuptK0zb
R1sZgSu5vj/1rmQ+nX+UE/bPIAc4Jyy3QmzY
fK5CcCxDFzAFM2tSJxpv+U8uKaTFR8LUz4YC
rBJ9QT0pgkiQLmU2KbSMW2i4UOQzKsjIehmM
pkT2OsUFUrIWKtsyynwKHwqqTs3jDJKOPGy8
9uNwGHMvnaTWy3F+qPVc1uQLJI/X9yC5mTIi
B3j6SKzq/8K5og3oxGKA8n9Muy/bRs+2nf5V
j8kgT2QAj2SBfvi+VFHTqVlZHvWra/3D3cID
vPntqbMeshFY42OggUXlDxR7J9jpn/O7+qIc
88pqCZMLCU74KHR9jw/+N8eVU+EVK8fUhnRg
hY29eOeIXFXzY5gX3kvgM1nHPZyEPb0tj/up
/vRij5NWoGEp0kaNxgNeV9wTYciLqBb9lM+W
rUVRoN5o6iYv10Azrly7nEL8SrVf1/nyCCT5
I9yLWxtFiyL4K95597YIBR/EGVYYRiNRwBZk
kzvPoVBLk07iOTHPxcxuc4+aC0AGOFIBoPub
HFVt4GYmA5XpP9EFv8eEG6RLUbF8U9lwk0z9
z3ftg5PZPFCHRDWws2b+Qe+E1DYsj7xUsJMe
2wi+BZ3FRIspBBAR4ys0YIgQYxdBrc/kCiYB
EkWPP/13Xt7b76p6QE1rDf3FQRnseUtnzYE=
)
NSEC mail.secure.chlab.net. NS SOA MX RRSIG NSEC
DNSKEY

256 3 5 (
AwEAAbDCPKM+ej4HPCjvoVqz60+YNtcQbnmi
yyrjPh/y5uGAYgYCAntgf/ildqZj6P8yoI3C
SKnL4eEM4WGCbmLE4NYpMad+DWb9RJFH+oZZ
psbvQHtcELw9IXm69wOLtrLcSU3jtq9t2GBu
kv9v2CRp9uJG6ZL3tEa1q35Uhu9ReXh1EOgV
MRXgNlY96oRuvWlcC8BJRJ/jCTIMORi4B37j
NKqxauQ9CeJfLU802aIb0rGm8/LGERivYCsf
BM7v37CanDe3BCbOVL1jrckXLtZb9jV1jago
eLz9J5dc7M0NwZHxnMGgHEHr9aeYn5A+O930
ZWq/B7Dp6s8Mzxn1awqmz6AzkksfYMpTSGji

Figure 11. Zone file for secure.chlab.net signed zone (16 KB), part 3 of 5.
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@

mail

45DJ
) ; key tag = 24645
DNSKEY
257 3 5 (
AwEAAeu2+yxFHn/E8EAZN7lLJ7nrhWyPiurs
yuiHnxA8zyU55mGDM/yIHJ/dFNEzdsn2Ytp5
QQ3ysnEuUdR+OYkPnoISeY2ozHUjLg8m8Tfy
lXNvddMFW5Qunfogh+FNNQuHYsfpFjXM2eDt
cTVejCHikkREbEERbhcI+gJAVLu+PkBMnxyW
UyDME52AIY42HUcLAwBZZKg4MOB+pENIQBvB
GPthrTXGkleKcNxRGCRZDXlKgSPxf+voXfr8
deyBTQY13x03Tf1k+4nZYhANCFbw39MyfMHc
CmFHpUTq2G3QCxl1D6kMRflpxrDVgxIhmUYz
HKxGGuxoQuGQO3FB+21IIN5z3sZGJFKEkyxO
VoBqX4cn8GGUj6BmhwJhiwQhe+AjiZkGQb9G
GG9yroOjtKh8rJheCCC1oCGCZClIlXBXlnl0
ZTtO/UxKNckXEMQlglzrbL4X9nd3HlGviEZC
jlNuKQpCV0X+9MmKcDhK9/rseltz+ZsUW62U
3mJRx106eiXzhI/gt82s1V1ts4MasmYSapV7
eZOqC2vOB3E8G4ZC4lp4m6U3arJ1NqRGnC55
zzZv5PKa6sefX02YnSDguvG3a9nYAtGDj4Xz
/1AdXt3vMbjrfvtEM3gsB4ePJoUDN3TpvTW8
dZhNuzrLNuQyz7CNMGSdYE9xwNQcI7x89+mE
g2ad
) ; key tag = 62944
A
10.0.20.111
RRSIG A 5 4 3600 20100209215255 (
20100110215255 24645 secure.chlab.net.
mTLSg41aBFBw0GyaQViaUV9rsuWcP5xZg87/
eogCmpfndO66wKRmfODfev6ozfMw+TVnuNW9
/sb+CNK/LUYaf5DIc1yhCkYoeQQroFwiERa+
dNBdR2eOG4uN3TVdHTyNgPAO3rHgEYGShf5P
Ge+xGQBfy9BciY1eDrYkmYIGOdsFI+d0QTGA
7dP58fFu6MEPs6j80Qw2i+nUPL/9iJeDteBb
jR59zcTwRtwVgFVCjR/SmeoW+DgLxIqGtyuS
gdx/C5rQ1qiN74CiZgOS+O/MBypRjulGE5C3
TfIAoaEKWLc8l7s604Hpgx5iLUwG9XSh3eBj
dk4NikzvMtjbGuGQWGalc7GXA/amzC1ye4Qk
GzeTSFml4onatLKSfPQ4UJlWsgvHi/ZvMCEP
UoNAWPcLnkD8KmmCdPNpV3ltyOpMttGbAJlB
rnMWR59JGULB9R/6xl1RFeo/P1pARAbDilqZ
YOy9UcxKtjDCi01gIRiWFH2/tQBnrhqKGxpU
+nhyhWbvbZ1JtGo7JwDD4mdxuO3irr2Xfl54
w06dEoPD1RXwsGKTOAfpfLGk+FiBw2adjc9m
Uw5wgBk6cfhLfiHLoHXWVrl+f6c9d3jWAXlL
QjDrlbvhrgpWafZcBj8hOPCidBTE52VRttsz
DerBV/xzigABmqTRlWjhARqgraLJALOTaqk=
)
RRSIG NSEC 5 4 3600 20100209215255 (
20100110215255 24645 secure.chlab.net.
A4lBEKQVlak2bwqt8YVrFR/+/u8Adz3mNW01

Figure 12. Zone file for secure.chlab.net signed zone (16 KB), part 4 of 5.
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www

meMYF+hD7bumB0M+c/uUg0fCZb79GpwqLWZY
KS0pqloPyWg0tNvJhtKS/vtDanH+7LaVwOzN
9BVISgbsvrWcyApqZTiX6HFQsgkkQaPbOqwf
ejnj/EV/F5HxaxtIL+XRmjs2r3eASOez1til
0GUxN+6atnxNsAbWqP03FUfySJDa+5/9wmgo
fZ7+WLKlZcwOlHrUGI6OiWdG74XpM0jfT0Nl
TumBwcoALdHP0RO/rPsI+mDtxC5MIdusvY6D
R5RJqVQY5SrC5rY/idAZamLEoQKBXeMCZy8Z
zwOYPdndWz7mS9d6j09PBSCu0NYZwq2hoEQ=
)
NSEC www.secure.chlab.net. A RRSIG NSEC
A
10.0.20.112
RRSIG A 5 4 3600 20100209215255 (
20100110215255 24645 secure.chlab.net.
Rvt+0/dPDzgAP2AwS0dc4j2LrWzwH4OHqqtH
jb5CGQaFEVmksgmdmtjeei8Pm3bXuSZxxWI7
ESPrqf9UmKLd3D45RmCx0Y+4Om8Pr0SBeNeK
KCiGWQXl/wVzFT/mlDfxBx26B5mxMLFFpbX0
mp7OMlyn8wTmcfnpILW39n4t0XP83IVIXd0a
1laztC4jNpGwAGi2EFHigttXXu0/BJv2D1Rm
y5v/tSo938TnEYycIQs0Am/QfAuSwbIJ+/kO
sPoKDYFsWkVyPyWGaufBAqNbGJJXD6KpBGR7
+E/ea6YcDoUXgRIe1iQCeV16AIFxsrUUwmpX
O7kqqZlUckLFtG6jLMbTcDc3dPH5t9/wK+Bg
bGuEbPgv+UClYdSknsJUCSwxTFZlVhNL6wZ3
K0wicNu+rcYKQMpxv67A6yQ9jyX+ZJxAyevL
iO8ysVt5iRpx8GsquPqEEX+HAbgTRu9cChOe
Tuhc82I8QxK3V3oJvkSZJbBOoXn3gFEvf72I
RUcv2ATMjZ4odPoa/XLbAwousVQ/Z4YDZX+q
7TX3H/jzY1RQC0s9ZzKDSa7sXNkJzavjbRT1
iVA2zh2hTVMqkSdrTHU4i82UAcWropi2uH8f
FZhsMlw2kdw0tz2lyTvl53C7uHCcxvUyb4z2
6GwWEUqE85z8hUw8YVcpH3Jzj2Zt6vLosk4=
)
RRSIG NSEC 5 4 3600 20100209215255 (
20100110215255 24645 secure.chlab.net.
lDuL4dkXGqwgc2wyXgK1ZHcxlZP8kinFOYlZ
zLJSqNOK4JQrepVa2Y9db2agidFxS70sP8kj
THfgMd9yEVBqaF5HJ8TBMW3CFVg/u4htUONW
q2qznk5Jlmlhiy5TOin2AUmq8bS3w65SAeH5
UZDQqi4ms4JmsXejuygcq7pwDRAjud2Nvv+3
6PeJ3uW0Kw6M4oBkBEfZyNkfzTXRc8pHbPWu
TpuUATw/E1LMQYdTQLA2fCl7v9nWR5VJq4z1
hB4jPzrMSvNb1xm1TcE1rMr1crbnPUPrY/jn
EXwfTyAOEqiHmvr/aMwzsHThn35X14FMra0V
EWQUgbbgf1OSxcXQo3awB4NM9otCQWWlPjnp
gx9d99XWYIn/pkexXASlff1agk8yZULaCdYt
lfrsWsg3R7v/TiE3Q8FxYbWlyJVxCVqJNQ2S
mrRhXH7XaxxmvvJI7sklK+fuYNilFITTRvll
kYndOt5+MTvSTYK/rkHh+7PrJEGoTieN9zZd

Figure 13. Zone file for secure.chlab.net signed zone (16 KB), part 5 of 5.

61

EVALUATION OF MICROSOFT DNSSEC
secure.chlab.net.

3600

IN DNSKEY
257 3 5 (
AwEAAeu2+yxFHn/E8EAZN7lLJ7nrhWyPiurs
yuiHnxA8zyU55mGDM/yIHJ/dFNEzdsn2Ytp5
QQ3ysnEuUdR+OYkPnoISeY2ozHUjLg8m8Tfy
lXNvddMFW5Qunfogh+FNNQuHYsfpFjXM2eDt
cTVejCHikkREbEERbhcI+gJAVLu+PkBMnxyW
UyDME52AIY42HUcLAwBZZKg4MOB+pENIQBvB
GPthrTXGkleKcNxRGCRZDXlKgSPxf+voXfr8
deyBTQY13x03Tf1k+4nZYhANCFbw39MyfMHc
CmFHpUTq2G3QCxl1D6kMRflpxrDVgxIhmUYz
HKxGGuxoQuGQO3FB+21IIN5z3sZGJFKEkyxO
VoBqX4cn8GGUj6BmhwJhiwQhe+AjiZkGQb9G
GG9yroOjtKh8rJheCCC1oCGCZClIlXBXlnl0
ZTtO/UxKNckXEMQlglzrbL4X9nd3HlGviEZC
jlNuKQpCV0X+9MmKcDhK9/rseltz+ZsUW62U
3mJRx106eiXzhI/gt82s1V1ts4MasmYSapV7
eZOqC2vOB3E8G4ZC4lp4m6U3arJ1NqRGnC55
zzZv5PKa6sefX02YnSDguvG3a9nYAtGDj4Xz
/1AdXt3vMbjrfvtEM3gsB4ePJoUDN3TpvTW8
dZhNuzrLNuQyz7CNMGSdYE9xwNQcI7x89+mE
g2ad
) ; key tag = 62944

Figure 14. Keyset for secure.chlab.net zone.
secure.chlab.net.

3600

3600

IN DS 62944 5 1 (
476534EF4273D9BC63D37F41511BB369B03F
6A63 )
DS
62944 5 2 (
D84278C232E5079EFEB8EFC49762697C3AA1
F27643648DCA62D4F05F0EB556DB )

Figure 15. DSset for secure.chlab.net zone.
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Figure 16. Screenshot of NRPT settings in Windows Server 2008 R2 management console.

Figure 17. Screenshot of NRPT settings in Windows 7 resultant set of policy tool.
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Appendix B – Test Plan

Test 1 – DNSSEC Functionality in Windows Server 2008 R2
i.

Build a DNSSEC-enabled DNS server and a DNSSEC-signed zone, following the
instructions in the Microsoft DNSSEC Deployment Guide. Document any discrepancies
between actual install and the documentation.

ii.

Issue a test DNS query from a Windows Server 2008 R2 DNSSEC-enabled caching
server.
a. On the caching server, verify
i. The DNS Server cache is empty.
ii. The caching server is configured to use the Windows Server 2008 R2 server
hosting the signed zone as its forwarder.
iii. The caching server is configured with the signed zone KSK in its trusted
roots.
b. From a command line on the DNS caching server, use nslookup <hostname> to issue
the query.
c. Is the response DNSSEC-validated? Use a packet capture tool to capture the query
and response. Check whether the “validated” bit is set in the response.

iii.

Issue a test DNS query from a Windows Server 2003 non-DNSSEC caching server. Is the
non-DNSSEC server able to query the signed zone hosted in Windows?
a. On the caching server, verify
i. The DNS Server cache is empty.
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ii. The caching server is configured to use the Windows Server 2008 R2 server
hosting the signed zone as its forwarder.
b. From a command line on the DNS caching server, use nslookup <hostname> to issue
the query.
c. Is the response DNSSEC-validated? Use a packet capture tool to capture the query
and response. Check whether the “validated” bit is set in the response.
iv.

Issue a test DNS query from a BIND DNSSEC-enabled caching server. Is the query
DNSSEC-validated?
a. On the caching server, verify
i. The DNS Server cache is empty.
ii. The caching server is configured to use the Windows Server 2008 R2 server
hosting the signed zone as its forwarder.
iii. The caching server is configured with the signed zone KSK in its trusted
roots.
b. From a command line on the DNS caching server, use nslookup <hostname> to issue
the query.
c. Is the response DNSSEC-validated? Use a packet capture tool to capture the query
and response. Check whether the “validated” bit is set in the response.

v.

Issue a test DNS query from a BIND non-DNSSEC caching server. Is the query
successful?
a. On the caching server, verify
i. The DNS Server cache is empty.
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ii. The caching server is configured to use the Windows Server 2008 R2 server
hosting the signed zone as its forwarder.
b. From a command line on the DNS caching server, use nslookup <hostname> to issue
the query.
c. Is the response DNSSEC-validated? Use a packet capture tool to capture the query
and response. Check whether the “validated” bit is set in the response.
vi.

Issue a test DNS query from a Windows Server 2008 R2 caching server against a BIND
authoritative server with DNSSEC-signed zone. Is the query successful?
a. On the caching server, verify
i. The DNS Server cache is empty.
ii. The caching server is configured to use the BIND server hosting the signed
zone as its forwarder.
b. From a command line on the DNS caching server, use nslookup <hostname> to issue
the query.
c. Is the response DNSSEC-validated? Use a packet capture tool to capture the query
and response. Check whether the “validated” bit is set in the response.

vii.

Test DNSSEC Lookaside Validation.
a. Configure the Windows Server 2008 R2 DNS server Trusted Roots tab: Add a known
DNSSEC Lookaside Validation server (Verisign?) to the Trusted Roots tab.
b. Issue a query against a signed zone that is known to be hosted at the DNSSEC
Lookaside Validation service provider.
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c. Is the query successful? Is the query DNSSEC-validated? Use a packet capture tool to
capture the query and response. Check whether the “validated” bit is set in the
response.
Test 2 – DNSSEC Functionality in Windows 7, Member of an Active Directory Domain
i.

Build a Group Policy Object with a Name Resolution Policy Template (NRPT) that
requires DNSSEC validation for the signed test zone. Apply the GPO to the Windows 7
client through the Active Directory domain. Run the RSOP.msc tool to verify that the
Windows 7 client received the NRPT settings.

ii.

Verify that the Windows 7 client has the Windows Server 2008 R2 DNS Server as its
primary DNS server in TCP/IP configuration.

iii.

Issue a DNS query from the Windows 7 client against the signed zone.
a. Type “ipconfig /flushdns” to verify that the local cache is clear.
b. Type “ping <hostname>” to trigger a DNS query for <hostname>.
c. Did the non-validating security-aware stub resolver successfully resolve the query?
d. Use a packet capture tool to capture the query and response. Check whether the
“validated” bit is set in the response.

iv.

Change the A record for <hostname> in the signed DNS zone, but do not re-sign the
zone. (This should cause DNSSEC validation to fail.)

v.

Issue a DNS query from the Windows 7 client against the signed zone.
a. Type “ipconfig /flushdns” to verify that the local cache is clear.
b. Type “ping <hostname>” to trigger a DNS query for <hostname>.
c. Did the non-validating security-aware stub resolver successfully resolve the query? If
not, document any error messages.
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d. Use a packet capture tool to capture the query and response. Check whether the
“validated” bit is set in the response.
Test 3 – DNSSEC Functionality in Windows 7, Stand-alone Client
i.

Follow the instructions in the Microsoft DNSSEC Deployment Guide to configure the
Windows 7 client to require DNSSEC validation for the test zone. Verify that no Group
Policy—NRPT is applying to the Windows 7 client.

ii.

Issue a DNS query from the Windows 7 client against the signed zone.
a. Type “ipconfig /flushdns” to verify that the local cache is clear.
b. Type “ping <hostname>” to trigger a DNS query for <hostname>.
c. Did the non-validating security-aware stub resolver successfully resolve the query? If
not, document any error messages.
d. Use a packet capture tool to capture the query and response. Check whether the
“validated” bit is set in the response.

iii.

Change the A record for <hostname> in the signed DNS zone, but do not re-sign the
zone. (This should cause DNSSEC validation to fail.)

iv.

Issue a DNS query from the Windows 7 client against the signed zone.
a. Type “ipconfig /flushdns” to verify that the local cache is clear.
b. Type “ping <hostname>” to trigger a DNS query for <hostname>.
c. Did the non-validating security-aware stub resolver successfully resolve the query? If
not, document any error messages.
d. Use a packet capture tool to capture the query and response. Check whether the
“validated” bit is set in the response.

Test 4 – DNSSEC Administration
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Observe and document steps required for DNSSEC key management:
a. Generating keys
b. Key rollover
c. Key distribution
d. Look specifically for command line tools, right-click options, GUI interfaces,
wizards, help files.
e. Check to see if the DNS Server utilizes any existing Windows technologies to
facilitate key management. For example, Windows Update, Certificate Management,
Active Directory Replication.
f. Does the DNS Server GUI provide any indications for what keys have been
generated, what keys are associated with what zones, key lifetimes?

ii.

Observe and document steps required for DNSSEC zone signing.
a. Look specifically for command line tools, right-click options, GUI interfaces,
wizards, help files.
b. What steps are required to revert to an unsigned zone?
c. Does the DNS Server GUI include any visual indications that the zone is signed?

iii.

Make some mistakes intentionally, and observe whether the Windows DNS Server has
any built-in safeguards to help prevent a system administrator from making the mistakes.
a. Modify records in a signed zone (without re-signing the zone). Does DNS Server
block this action or issue any warning to the DNS administrator telling the admin that
it will be necessary to re-sign the zone?
b. Generate a ZSK with an intentionally short life span and allow the key to expire.
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i. Does the DNS Server GUI provide any visual indication that the zone has an
expired key?
ii. Are any events logged in the DNS event log?
iii. Issue a query against the zone with the expired key. (Verify that the DNS
query fails.) Does the DNS Server log an error in the event log?
iv.

Is the Windows “nslookup” command line tool DNSSEC-aware?
a. Issue “nslookup <hostname>”.
b. Observe whether the responses provide DNSSEC-related feedback.
c. Increase nslookup debug level to see more comprehensive information.

v.

Are the Windows Event Logs DNSSEC-aware?
a. Look for DNSSEC messages in the DNS Server event log. Expected messages could
include:
i. Zone signed (informational)
ii. Keys nearing expiration (warning)
iii. Keys expired (error)
b. Look for messages in the Windows 7 Application and System log.
i. DNSSEC validation failures

Test 5 – DNSSEC Documentation
i.

Windows Server 2008 R2 documentation
a. Look in the OS help file for DNSSEC documentation.
b. Look in the DNS GUI help file for DNSSEC documentation.
c. Look at the DNS GUI and evaluate whether it is “self-documenting”.

EVALUATION OF MICROSOFT DNSSEC

71

d. At a command line type “nslookup /?” and review the results for any references to
DNSSEC.
ii.

Windows 7 documentation
a. Look in the OS help file for DNSSEC references.
b. Look in the Internet Explorer help file for DNSSEC references.

iii.

Microsoft Web Site documentation. What documentation exists at:
a. TechNet site
b. Support site
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Appendix C – Glossary

ACL – Access Control List
BIND – Berkley Internet Name Daemon
DDoS – Distributed Denial of Service
DLV – DNSSEC Lookaside Validation
DNS – Domain Name System
DNSKEY – A new resource record type, containing the public encryption key
DNSSEC – DNS Security Extensions
DO – DNSSEC OK
DS – A new resource record type, Delegation Signer
EV – Extended Validation
GUI – graphical user interface
IETF – Internet Engineering Task Force
IP – Internet Protocol
IPSec – IP Security
KSK – Key Signing Key
MMC – Microsoft Management Console
MX – Mail Exchanger
NRPT – Name Resolution Policy Template
NSEC – A new resource record type, Next Secure
NSEC3 – A new resource record type, Next Secure version 3
R2 – Release 2
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RFC – Request for Comment
RR – Resource Record
RRSIG – A new resource record type, Resource Record Signature
RSA – Rivest, Shamir and Adleman
SSL – Secure Sockets Layer
TCP/IP – Transmission Control Protocol / Internet Protocol
TLD – Top Level Domain
TTL – time to live
UI – user interface
ZSK – Zone Signing Key
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